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The authors sum uip the central issue of ethics in the conduict of controlled clinical trials in these two paradoxes: 'first, it is unethical to use treatment the cfficacv of which has not beenz examined scientifically; second, i't is also uinethical to examine the efficacy of treatment scientifically.' In this paper they set out to cldenonstrate how these antithetical statements apply in controlled trials conducted in psychiatric patients. In sutch trials the problem of obtaining, informned consent may be acute, but in these patients giving 'inforned' consent might contribute to a further exacerbation of the illness. Nevcrtheless the problem cannot be evaded, and scientific judgments must be applied to treatment for it to be sound and inmproved for the further bcnefit of patients. These problems in the case of psychiatric controlled trials are a part of the methodology, and in Germany a new drug law has been drafted to attempt to clarify the issue.
T'he authors briefljy discuss its application, and its consequences if such a law were enacted. British psychiatrists have exactly the same problems to face but so far no attempts have been mzade to establish a l!cgal framework.
The paradox in medical ethics
The central issues of ethics in medical treatment can be summed up by the following paradoxical statements: first, it is unethical to use treatment the efficacy of which has not been examined scientifically; second, it is also unethical to examine the efficacy of treatment scientifically.
It should be clearly understood that the ethical judgment regarding the use of a treatment does not refer to the motivation of the doctor but rather to the efficacy of the therapeutic procedure in the patient. Thus, a passionate intention to help the obsessed patient gave rise to the cruel, mediaeval practice of exorcism1, and 'good-heartedness', therapeutic engagement and humanitarian ideology have caused some doctors today 'to relieve the custodial-repressively treated psychiatric patient from the totalitarian institutions'. We know, In the following paragraphs we shall focus on the practical consequences of three essentials in controlled trials when applied to psychiatric patients.
THE DESIGN OF THE TRIAL
A rigidly designed trial is one of the requirements of controlled trials according to contemporary standards. It requires that the individual needs of a patient -such as the additional drug treatment of insomnia or anxiety -must be sacrificed in favour of the formalized design which excludes additional medication or reduction of dosage. The objective of such a trial is to prove that, for example, the antidepressant drug under investigation possesses fewer side effects or a faster onset of action than the reference drug. Thus, a conflict arises between the ethical obligation to relieve the suffering of the individual patient here and now t-3 the best of our knowledge, and the scientific necessity for an unobjectionable experimental design. But it is also evident that a tlerapeutic trial which is inconclusive due to a poor design or negligence in carrying out a good design is also unethical because (a) it burdens or at least troubles the patient needlessly; (b) it will call for additional experiments unnecessarily and add to the burden of other patients; (c) it prevents the medical community from reaching a clear judgment about the advantages and disadvantages of a new drug as quickly as possible.
The new C erman drug law (39, I. I) allows the performance of a drug trial only if there is enouglh evidence for the assumption that the drug to be tested restores the health of the patient or relieves his suffering. This formula secures the therapeutic trial legallv; however, it does not resolve the ethical dilemma7. The ethical problem is not whether the patient can be wholly cured by the new treatment, but rather whether -unrestrained by the drug trial design -the patient could have been treated more efficiently.
THE NECESSITY FOR RANDOMIZATION
Ethical problems can also result from the scientific demand to randomize and to avoid selection. As an exampie, we may consider the investigation in the United Kingdom (supported by the Medical Research Council) which was performed with great scientific care to determine whether it would be possible to examine with unobjectionable methodology the efficacy of several psychotherapeutic procedures8. As it turned out, some investigators did not keep to the rule of randomization in dealing with patients who, according to the personal experience of the investigators, could be helped only by analytical psychotherapy. These investigators came to the conclusion that because of ethical considerations it was not feasible to prove the efficacy of psychotherapy in a controlled trial according to the methodological design they had agreed upon previously (see also 9).
'Since ethical issues may have played a decisive roie in determining the negative outcome of the study, the investigating team considered this problem in more detail. Not unexpectedly, it appeared that the issues are complex and operate at a number of different levels. Where uncertainty about the effectiveness of a certain treatment is widely shared by all those concerned in its use, then there will be little difficulty in setting up properly controlled studies for its evaluation. But this is not the case with psychotherapy. Some patients believe that thLis is the only form of treatment that will help them (and, in contrast to drug trials, the nature of the treatment they, in fact, receive cannot be concealed from them 'informed consent' in therapeutic trials. This also can be illustrated by two paradoxical statements: first, it is unethical to perform a therapeutic trial without the informed consent of the patient; second it is also unethical to perform a therapeutic trial with informed consent.
The first statement seems to be self evident, but it should nevertheless provoke some reflections about the inconstancy of ethical standards. For example, there is no evidence to suggest that the 26 hospitalized acute schizophrenics in whom Klaesi used 'sleep' therapy for the first time in 1920, or the catatonic schizophrenic subjected by Cerletti and Bini to the first treatment with electroshock in I938, had been informed about the experimental quality of the new therapy or were even asked for their consent*. None of these early investigators would have considered informed consent to be a necessary prerequisite for his experiment; rather they judged their experiments as ethically justified by the expected therapeutic benefit for mankind. In our times, however, the demand of society for scientific progress competes more and more with the modem, liberal consciousness of the individual's right to self determination"1. It also seems well founded that this right to self determination should be explicitly defended in view of the immanent dangers resulting from the explosive increase in experimental investigations in human subjects and also because of the demand for more therapeutic trials which will be the inevitable consequence of the new German drug law 7, 12, 13.
The second statement of the paradox raising ethical objections against the informed consent of the patient may be less evident. This statement can be clarified, however, by considering the specific methodology as well as the therapeutic customs of psychiatry.
The specific scientific methodology in psychiatry derives from the fact that the effect of treatment might be related to the specific personality of the doctor as well as to that of the patient. The difficulties in investigating these influences of personality on the therapeutic effect arise from the complexity of the human individual and the obscure relationship between the biological milieu interne and the social milieu externe. Therefore, when testing the efficacy of a new psychiatric treatment, the therapist must be the object of the trial as a specific therapeutic factor or his unspecific influence must be reliably controlled. The same applies to the influences resulting from the subjectivity of the patient. Thus, it is evident that the blind technique plays an important role in scientific trials of new therapeutic procedures in psychiatry. The However, little is known about the influence of fully or partially informing the patient on the validity of blind trials. 'Full information' includes not only information of the expected effects and risks of the drug to be tested, but also the fact that the patient will be subjected to an experiment which is based on randomization and the blind technique*. A serious problem can arise if the reference drug in a double-blind trial is a placebo, since many patients might refuse to consent to the trial. In addition, those patients who do consent to the trial represent a biased sample, and the results obtained from them will not be representative of the entire group of patients with the particular illness under investigation but only of those patients who will consent to a therapeutic trial. As long as the influence of the information remains obscure and its scientific relevance doubtful, fully informing the patient may be of doubtful importance from an ethical point of view. Here, it is to be noted that ever since the first edition of Martini's methodology2' in I947 , it has been regarded as a necessary prerequisite of a controlled therapeutic trial that the patient be unaware of the experimental character of that therapy. The German Pharmacological Association has supported this fundamental postulate when commenting on the first draft of the new German drug law22' 23, 24. The ethical foundation of experimental work will probably not be improved if this scientific-ethical principle is renounced. It seems to be much better under some circumstances to burden the investigator with the full responsibility that a clinical trial is unobjectionable from an ethical point of view25 than to obtain the 'informed consent' of the patient. If help is needed in making this decision, it could be found in a peer committee whose members must have sufficient inside knowledge of the psychiatric reality (see also reference 26). Quoting Ingelfinger27, 'The subject's only real protection, the public as well as the medical profession must recognize, depends on the conscience and compassion of the investigator and his peers'.
The requirement of 'informed consent' in general treatment could also lead to ethical problems. For example, the psychiatrist would have to decide at the beginning of a course of analytical psychotherapy whether the patient should be informed about the danger of his suicide during *It is striking that the statements concerning 'ethics' in die latest Food and Drugs Administration 'guidelines for psychotropic drugs' do not even touch upon this problem 8.
The inherent paradox of clinical trials in psychiatry 171 treatment or of exacerbation of his illness; at the beginning of treatment using behaviour therapy about the risks of a shift of symptoms; at the beginning of a course of treatment with antidepressive drugs about the probability of a druginduced agranulocytosis. The physician might prefer to consider that not informing the patient was ethically justified since such information might bring damage to him rather than benefit. Withholding information seems to be not only ethically justified but even necessary if, for example, the hopeless feelings of a depressed patient would be reinforced by the information that antidepressive activity can be observed only in approximately 6o per cent of treated patients, or if the retarded depressive patient is unable to decide whether or not he will consent to the trial, in spite of all the information given to him.
In many cases the real question might be whether the patient is able to give informed consent at all. A patient who suffers from delusions of guilt and believes that he should be punished and is not worthy of receiving a new drug treatment cannot in fact give his 'informed consent'. According to the law, the guardian of the patient should be asked for permission in such a case. However, it appears to be unethical to install a guardian only in order to perform a drug trial because the social consequences of guardianship may be more injurious to the patient than the very small risk of injury caused by the drug trial. Keeping strictly to the law can thus lead to unethical behaviour. This suggests that the researcher should not be completely relieved of the necessity to make his own ethical decisions in this situation2O0 27 Legal rules or improved ethical standards? Several individual aims are in conflict: i) the individual's right to self determination must be protected despite the demand of society for scientific progress, and 2) the necessity to perform controlled trials goes against the obligation to treat the individual patient in an optimal way. These problems cannot be solved by making one idea superior to another but only by reaching the best compromise between the individual aims, all of them having their special ethical justification. Such compromises will not be facilitated by precise legal rules, for the more detailed the rules that exist, the greater become the following risks.
I) The conditions under which scientific trials must be performed could become so different from the reality of treatment that the results of such trials will lack validity. To quote Lasagna, 'Certainly most drugs would not be applied under the conditions of a double-blind trial, including informed consent, hospitalization, avoiding additional medication, prescription by experts, etc'29.
2) Legal rules for every detail of a clinical trial might finally be ignored or shirked in an uncontrolled way. This could lead to poorly planned drug trials and make it very difficult to judge the scientific value of the experimental results.
3 Novel and urgent ethical questions alwavs arise when the quality or quantity of new scientific discoveries has reached a certain limit. If, in this situation, the ability to perceive ethical problems and to decide on them in a competent way does not keep up with scientific progress, then a moratorium will be needed in order tnat scientific progress does not get out of our ethical control39. Similar concepts are beintg discussed at present in other scientific disciplines, eg, in tle 'I;Id of human genetics40.
